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1. 
 
In Violence and Civility: On the Limits of Political Philosophy, which comprises reworked 
versions of his 1996 Wellek Lectures at the University of California, Irvine, Étienne Balibar 
attempts to think through the consequences of an aporia that lies at the heart of modern 
Western political practice and reflection. On the one hand, the idea that violence can and 
must be eliminated “is a constitutive element of our idea of politics” (2). This idea is 
expressed especially clearly in the early modern social contract theories that posit a state of 
nature—a state of affairs in which persons engage “with one another only in terms of the 
degree of force each has”—which must be left behind and replaced by the political state, 
characterized as the “union of a multitude of human beings under laws of right.”1 But on the 
other hand, history strongly suggests that we do not know how to do this. Our best efforts 
to eliminate violence from political life have never entirely succeeded, and in fact have often 
contributed to the production of even more violence. This, Balibar thinks, is a genuine 
aporia in the sense of the term suggested by its etymology: there really is no way out of it. 
Nonetheless, we must discover a way of maneuvering within the aporia, since renouncing 
the political project altogether is obviously not an option. Neither, of course, does it make 
sense to continue to pursue the political project in accordance with the same old models. 
Balibar’s primary goal in Violence and Civility is to argue that the best response to the aporia !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, The Cambridge Edition of the 
Works of Immanuel Kant, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 456 
[6: 312; 313]. Page numbers in brackets refer to those of the Akademie Edition. 
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consists in what he calls a politics of civility, which aims not to suppress all violence, but 
rather to exclude the extreme forms of violence that render politics impossible. Balibar has 
developed many of the central ideas of Violence and Civility in other texts, most importantly in 
some of the essays collected in his Politics and the Other Scene, but in no other text has he 
presented his argument so coherently and so comprehensively.2 This makes Violence and 
Civility an ideal beginning point for anyone approaching Balibar’s political philosophy for the 
first time. As he often does, though, Balibar develops his argument through close readings of 
important texts from the history of philosophy. Because these readings are so detailed and so 
interesting in their own right, it is easy to miss the forest for the trees, losing sight of the 
thread of argument that runs through the text. In what follows, then, I will attempt to state 
the argument of the text as straightforwardly as possible. 
Balibar’s argument in Violence and Civility can be understood as divided into three main 
parts. First, on the basis of his readings of Hobbes and Hegel, Balibar shows the different 
ways in which modern political theory and practice have failed to eliminate violence, leaving 
a remainder that he characterizes as “extreme violence.” Second, he describes the two 
heterogeneous forms that extreme violence takes—what he calls ultraobjective and 
ultrasubjective violence—and attempts to trace the genesis of each. Finally, he suggests the 
broad outlines of a politics of civility that would function to exclude both of these forms. 
The idea that politics emerges as a response to the problem of violence is associated 
most closely with the work of Thomas Hobbes. As is well known, Hobbes characterizes the 
pre-political state of nature as a “war of all against all.”3 Because the condition of persons in 
the state of nature is one of near equality, such that anyone would have a reasonable fear of 
being killed by anyone else, it is unlikely that the war of all against all would end with a 
decisive victory. The condition of war, then, would be likely to continue indefinitely. But this 
is intolerable. By what Hobbes calls a law of natural necessity, all persons strive to preserve 
their own lives, and what this obviously requires is that they do everything in their power to 
exit the state of nature. The only way to do this, Hobbes thinks, is for everyone to surrender 
his or her “right to all things,”4 establishing a commonwealth whose sovereign possesses 
what will later be called a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.”5 But this 
Hobbesian strategy, which Balibar characterizes as a strategy of counterviolence, does not so 
much eliminate violence as displace it. The Hobbesian state, Balibar argues, “can keep the 
peace in the social body only if it is virtually at war with it. The state is the bosom enemy of 
the society it protects” (32). Because the primary function of the state is to eliminate violence 
from society, it must be constantly suspicious of its own members. It thus “‘interpellates 
individuals as subjects’ (potentially violent, deviant, or rebellious individuals) in order to 
protect them against their own passions…” (32). As such, it is constantly haunted by the 
possibility of the return of the violence it strives to repress. 
The second major strategy for the elimination of violence—which Balibar characterizes 
as the strategy of conversion—is exemplified most clearly by Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy 
of Right. On Hegel’s account, violence is meaningful through and through. Its meaning !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Étienne Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene, trans. Christine Jones, James Swenson, and Chris Turner (London: 
Verso, 2002). Hereafter POS. See especially chapters 1 and 7. 
3 Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. and trans. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 30. 
4 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Revised Student Edition, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 92. 
5 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation” in Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and ed. H.H. 
Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78. 
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derives from the process of history, which just is the process of its conversion into 
legitimate, rational authority. At each stage of history we find a contradiction between 
infinite freedom and its finite instantiation in political institutions. These contradictions are 
resolved by “world-historical individuals” who advance the process of history by violently 
destroying inherited social and political structures. From the point of view of the existing 
structures, the actions of such world-historical individuals look like crimes. But a broader 
view reveals the deeper meaning of these crimes, which consists in their realizing the 
purposes of reason, effecting more legitimate political orders. As Balibar notes, though, we 
can no longer sustain this kind of historical optimism (49). We have good reason to doubt 
that violence is always meaningful, that destruction is always more basically construction; as 
Max Weber, Michel Foucault, and many others have taught us to see, there are forms of 
inconvertible violence that persist beneath the surface of official political representation (50). 
And as the twentieth century has definitively shown, history is characterized less by a 
progressive conversion of violence than by a cyclical return of apparently atavistic forms of 
cruelty (63). 
Balibar’s point in reviewing the two strategies is not merely to demonstrate that they 
have left a certain amount of violence unsuppressed or unconverted. Of course no state has 
completely succeeded in eliminating every sort of violence, including everything from violent 
crime and economic domination to bullying and microaggressions. Instead, Balibar wants to 
draw our attention to the ways in which the two strategies have failed to eliminate, and have 
even contributed to, the specific form of violence that he calls extreme violence. What 
makes this form of violence so important is that it undermines “the conditions of possibility 
of politics, beginning with the very possibility of struggle or agon” (142). One kind of 
extreme violence—what Balibar calls ultraobjective violence—“reduces human beings to the 
status of things that can be eliminated or instrumentalized at will in a world of commodities” 
(141). The classic example is the industrial reserve army described by Marx, a mass of 
proletarians whose labor is not needed but whose very superfluousness is valued by the 
owners of the means of production for its role in keeping wages low. Other examples 
include victims of epidemics and natural disasters in the global South and the Latin 
American poblácion chatarra or “junk people” who “have no place in the national and 
international plans for production and exchange.”6 The other kind of extreme violence—
what Balibar calls ultrasubjective violence—treats individuals and groups as “incarnations of 
evil, diabolical powers that threaten the subject from within and have to be eliminated at all 
costs, up to and including self-destruction” (52). This kind of violence, Balibar thinks, has its 
origin in the community’s having adopted an absolutely reified, fetishized identity, such that 
its most pressing imperative is to exclude any sort of otherness even at the price of its own 
destruction (60). The target of ultrasubjective violence is conceived not as a mere thing but 
rather as an implacable enemy whose very existence constitutes a mortal threat. Of course 
the most prominent example of this is Nazi Germany and its relation to its Jewish 
population. Both ways of engaging with others—as things to be managed and as incorrigibly 
evil threats to collective identity—foreclose the possibility of a genuinely political relation. In 
neither case do we deal with others, in Rawls’s memorable phrase, as “self-originating 
sources of valid claims.”7 There is no space left open for anything like cooperative, open-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Bertrand Ogilvie, “Violence et représentation: La production de l’homme jetable” in L’homme jetable, Essai sur 
l’exterminisme et la violence extrême (Paris: Editions Amsterdam, 2012), 128. Quoted in Balibar, 56. 
7 John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 543. 
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ended deliberation concerning the terms in accordance with which people will live together. 
The relation of extreme violence is rather the non-political relation of pure domination. 
Although Balibar believes it is valuable for purposes of analysis to treat ultraobjective 
and ultrasubjective violence as two distinct kinds, he also believes that they are intimately 
connected, like the two sides of a Möbius strip (72-73). In our dealings with others, we often 
find the two forms passing into each other in a way that seems entirely natural. I believe the 
Syrian refugee crisis provides a contemporary example of this. On the one hand, we in the 
West tend to view the crisis as a kind of natural disaster whose consequences must be 
managed. The refugees themselves are viewed as a burden to be borne (or to be resisted). 
For the most part, we do not view the refugees as making legitimate claims that we are 
obligated to take seriously; especially in Europe, they are present simply as a mass of 
humanity that must be dealt with in one way or another. But on the other hand, the refugees 
are also treated as dangerous enemies. In the United States, for example, thirty-one 
governors have refused to allow Syrian refugees into their states, citing concerns that the 
refugees will commit terrorist acts. Given the very rigorous vetting process that all refugee 
applicants go through in the United States, the likelihood that admitted refugees will commit 
acts of terrorist violence is quite low. The very pervasive fear of violence seems to have its 
basis, then, simply in the fact that the refugees are Muslims and that “we” are most decidedly 
not. The very presence of “them”—including even young orphans—is a threat. Despite the 
fact that being a mere thing is incompatible with being a subject with evil intentions, we slide 
back and forth between these conceptions with very little difficulty. 
Stated somewhat schematically, the task of politics, on Balibar’s account, is to prevent 
the extreme forms of violence from coinciding, to ensure that they “are separated by a 
distance that prevents individuals and groups (or ‘societies’) from being caught in the trap 
represented by the ideological deliriums of identity or economic and ecological disasters” 
(96). This conception of politics is explicitly opposed to the Aristotelian conception. For 
Aristotle, politics is “the common praxis of citizens” for whom matters of necessity are no 
longer the most pressing. Freed from the concerns of “the production and reproduction of 
life and the means of subsistence,” citizens are able to work together toward establishing the 
conditions necessary not merely for life but for the good life (97). For Balibar, on the other 
hand, politics must not be oriented first and foremost by any kind of ideal, but rather by a 
concern to preserve its own eminently fragile conditions of possibility; its primary concern 
must be to maintain “the precarious gap between the heterogeneous forms of extreme 
violence that threaten it with collapse from within” (98). 
This, of course, brings us to the $64,000 question: how, precisely, do we do this? How 
do we keep extreme violence at bay, thus preserving the conditions of possibility for politics? 
Balibar’s answer, developed in Chapter 4, is that we must practice what he calls a politics of 
civility. Balibar never explains precisely what he means by civility other than to say that it is 
the sort of politics whose aim is to resist extreme violence. Instead of providing a single, 
coherent theory of civility, Balibar unpacks the meaning of the concept by describing three 
different examples of it. The first of these, which he calls the strategy of hegemony, is based 
largely on the idea of Sittlichkeit that Hegel develops in Elements of the Philosophy of Right. One 
of the most important roles of the state, on Hegel’s account, is to provide a stable 
framework within which individuals can be recognized in their various identities. An 
individual has a “natural” identity based on his kinship relations, but he also has a more 
freely chosen identity based on the place he occupies within civil society. And at the highest 
level of abstraction, the individual is conceived as a citizen. These identities acquire social 
stability in the constitution, which officially recognizes them. Because all identities are 
! 5!
socially mediated, individuals are present within the state neither as self-identical, natural 
things nor as radically other to the constituted community.8 For the strategy of hegemony, 
then, it is the mediation of identity that preserves the space of politics against the two forms 
of extreme violence. Balibar is suspicious of this strategy, though, because it requires the 
normalization of individuals’ identities and because the processes of normalization 
unavoidably entail a certain degree of violence (113-114). He is more optimistic about the 
other two examples of the politics of civility: the majoritarian and minoritarian strategies. 
The former is an emancipatory strategy undertaken by various groups within society who are 
subjected to the domination of an oppressive minority. These heterogeneous groups work 
together to create a “people” that is “capable of yoking the emancipation of each of its 
component parts to the service of their common liberation” (109-110). Although Balibar 
believes that majoritarian movements are necessary for preserving the conditions of 
possibility of politics, he also recognizes their dangers. Most importantly, majoritarian 
movements run the risk of mimetically reproducing the ultrasubjective violence of the state 
apparatuses they oppose, viewing their perceived enemies as mortal threats to be eliminated 
(118). This is why a minoritarian strategy is equally indispensable. This strategy, inspired by 
the ideas of deterritorialization and becoming that Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari develop 
in A Thousand Plateaus, calls not for the creation of new, revolutionary identities but rather 
for a fluidification of identities. This strategy helps to prevent the formation of the kinds of 
rigidified identities that give rise to the desire to violently exclude perceived others. But 
Balibar worries that this strategy valorizes the deracination that already results from 
processes of economic globalization, which act on human beings as if they were mere things. 
To go too far in fluidifying identity, then, would be to run the risk of reproducing 
ultraobjective violence. The politics of civility thus requires a balance between the 
majoritarian and minoritarian strategies. 
Is this response to the problem of extreme violence satisfactory? I suspect that many 
readers will be convinced by Balibar’s careful, detailed accounts of the aporia of politics and 
of the dangers of ultrasubjective and ultraobjective violence, but will find his proposal for a 
politics of civility considerably less compelling. I would like to focus specifically on three 
potential worries. First, it seems that Balibar has drawn his picture of the politics of civility in 
such broad strokes that it ends up raising more questions than it answers. How can we tell, 
for example, whether our political practices are striking the right kind of balance between 
identification and disidentification? How can we know when it is appropriate to run the risks 
associated with each? How do we know when we have gone too far in one direction or the 
other? Following Deleuze and Guattari, Balibar seems to suggest that political actors require 
phronesis in order to judge well in these matters (124). In the absence of at least a little more 
contentful guidance, though, it is not clear that phronesis can carry the burden it is being 
asked to carry. Indeed, it appears as if the invocation of phronesis functions more to 
highlight the problem than to resolve it. 
Second—and this is closely related to the first worry—who are the “we” who pursue the 
strategies of civility? It is “we,” presumably, who must carefully steer the course between 
ultrasubjective and ultraobjective violence, preserving the fragile conditions of possibility for 
politics. But this “we” is not given. It is not a national “we” or a class-based “we.” It is not 
even the thinner post-national “we” of Habermasian constitutional patriotism. It is essential !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 I should state explicitly here that this is my own construction of Balibar’s argument. At no point does he 
explain precisely how the recognition of social identities within the state contributes to the exclusion of the 
extreme forms of violence. 
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to Balibar’s proposal that the “we” not be given, that its sense should remain in question. 
But this seems to undermine the sense of common purpose that is necessary to motivate 
individuals to share the burdens and benefits of coordinated action. 
The third concern one might have about the politics of civility is that it sets the bar too 
low. Balibar offers no prescriptions for bringing about forms of political life in which we 
would finally be able to realize our highest aspirations. His politics is oriented less by the pull 
of positive ideals—of the Good or the Just, for example—than by the imperative to keep at 
bay at least the very worst forms of violence. This fundamentally defensive conception of 
political action does not seem very inspiring. Even if we grant that the conditions of 
possibility for politics are fragile and that we must take great care to preserve them against 
the threats of extreme violence, we might still insist, following Aristotle, that the real 
business of politics is to promote the conditions within which human beings will be able to 
flourish. To aim lower than this is to undersell the power of political philosophy. 
I believe that Balibar has the resources to respond to all of these worries. The response 
to the first and third worries would be broadly the same: if one accepts the premises 
contained in what I have called the first and second parts of Balibar’s argument, then one is 
committed to accept a somewhat deflationary version of the politics of civility. Most 
importantly, Balibar believes that the project of politics really is aporetic: we must eliminate 
violence, but we do not know how. Despite our best efforts, he thinks, we will always be 
forced to reckon with a certain quantity of inconvertible violence. In an interview from 2005, 
Balibar characterized his commitment to the aporetic nature of politics as a kind of 
skepticism: “it is the profound conviction that practical solutions in politics as well as in life 
cannot be anticipated by theory.”9 The philosopher is simply not in a position to lay down a 
definitive set of prescriptions that activists could rely on in their efforts to establish just 
political orders. According to Balibar, the political philosopher should do “exactly the 
opposite,” working to undermine the “illusionary element of certitude” that theory tends to 
provide.10 Because we have no access to a God’s-eye view of political dynamics, we must do 
our best to invent solutions case by case. Balibar offers as an example the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. There is simply no hope for a genuinely just solution to this conflict, he thinks. Nor 
is it likely that either side will achieve total victory as defined by its own aims. On the one 
hand, the Israelis must recognize that the Palestinians are not going to leave voluntarily and 
that exterminating them or maintaining them in the position of second-class citizens is not a 
viable long-term strategy. And the Palestinians must recognize that the Israelis are not going 
to leave either. Political philosophy cannot point the way to an ideally just and non-violent 
solution to this impasse: “something has to be invented and that’s why Palestine is so 
important.”11 This uncertain work of invention is an essential part of the politics of civility. 
The response to the second worry—the one concerning the identity of the “we” who 
pursue the politics of civility—relies on ideas that Balibar develops in more detail in other 
texts. In his “Three Concepts of Politics: Emancipation, Transformation, Civility,” Balibar 
argues that “every identity is ambiguous…. Every individual combines several identities, which 
are unevenly significant, unevenly conflicted.”12 This fact is simply irreducible. We have 
identities linked to gender, ethnicity, religion, occupation, sexual preference, language, etc. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Diane Enns, “A Conversation with Étienne Balibar,” Symposium: The Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 9 
(2005): 392. 
10 Ibid., 391. 
11 Ibid., 390. 
12 Étienne Balibar, “Three Concepts of Politics: Emancipation, Transformation, Civility” in Balibar, POS, 28. 
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Social conflict often crystallizes around these different identities. Which identities are most 
salient and which remain in the background is determined to some extent by these conflicts, 
which of course change over time. Every society, then, must develop means of regulating 
these identity-based conflicts. For the state to try to resolve the conflicts by imposing from 
the top down a single, homogeneous identity on the entire population would be to run the 
risk of ultrasubjective violence. And to try to resolve the conflicts by promoting a 
“‘postmodern’ utopia” of freely floating identifications would be to run the risk of 
ultraobjective violence.13 The politics of civility, which attempts to preserve the space 
between these two extremes, has no choice then but to learn to live with the ambiguity and 
open-endedness of identity. 
 
2. 
 
Another recently published book, titled Violence, politique et civilité aujourd’hui: La Turquie 
aux prises avec ses tourments, picks up on many of these themes, demonstrating the real 
difficulties that arise in applying the politics of civility to concrete cases. The book was 
published in conjunction with a major conference, held in May of 2014 in Istanbul, which 
was devoted to Balibar’s Violence and Civility and to developing the political, philosophical, 
and anthropological implications of its leading ideas. The book comprises three essays: “Les 
luttes cloisonnées contre le pieuvre: les luttes anti-militaristes et féministes en Turquie” by 
the sociologist and political activist Pinar Selek, “L’autoritarisme et la violence: La Turquie 
face à ses démons” by the economist and columnist Ahmet Insel, and “Violence et politique: 
quelques questions” by Étienne Balibar. (The essay by Balibar is the first chapter of Violence 
and Civility.) Although the former two essays do not make explicit reference to Balibar’s 
work, they develop many of the same themes, focusing specifically on violence and civility in 
the Turkish social and political context. 
Insel’s and Selek’s essays both give special emphasis to the problem of identity and its 
relation to violence. Insel’s essay focuses on the violence that is produced as a consequence 
of the Turkish state’s attempt to impose a unified, homogeneous identity from the top 
down. Since the establishment of the republic in 1923, Turkey has been strongly committed 
to the fusion of the state and the nation. The founding principle of the new state, inscribed 
on the wall behind the Speaker’s desk in the Grand National Assembly, is that “sovereignty 
unconditionally belongs to the nation.” Because of its obsession with national unity, Turkish 
society has had a very difficult time accepting internal differences (39). But the republic has 
been multiethnic and multireligious from the very beginning, and so it has always had to deal 
with difference one way or another. It has tended to do so by treating those who did not 
conform to the dominant Turkish identity with suspicion. Opposition to dominant norms, 
according to Insel, has tended to be viewed as a kind of incipient treachery (37). In Balibar’s 
words, the state acts as the bosom enemy of the society it claims to protect, interpellating 
minority and non-conforming subjects as “potentially violent, deviant, or rebellious 
individuals.” Viewing these subjects as threats to its very existence, Turkey has consistently 
pursued a policy of pre-emptive violence, including torture, abuse of the judicial process, and 
deportation (40). This violence has been carried out in successive waves against non-Muslim 
populations, against Kurds demanding state recognition of their ethnic identity, against 
Alevis who have resisted assimilation into Sunni Islam, and against socialist and democratic 
political movements (40-41). Insel believes that these authoritarian tendencies have become !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Ibid., 29. 
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even more pronounced since 2002, when the socially conservative and nationalist AKP came 
to power. The fact that the AKP has consistently won parliamentary majorities since then 
suggests that the state’s commitment to national unity and homogeneity has broad popular 
support. This, of course, is worrying. But Insel is also cautiously optimistic: he believes that 
demands for pluralism, for increased rights of political participation, and for a decrease in 
social violence are becoming progressively stronger in Turkey, and that such demands will be 
the key to effecting the transition to a more genuinely democratic society. 
In order to bring about the more democratic future that Insel envisions, it will be 
necessary to pursue the delicate balance of identification and disidentification that 
characterizes Balibar’s politics of civility. And this brings us to Pinar Selek’s essay, which 
highlights both the necessity and the difficulties of achieving such a balance. Selek 
emphasizes the way in which the model of Turkish identity that has been promoted since 
1923 has been explicitly militaristic and that this has gone hand in hand with a conception of 
the identity “woman” that has been oppressive for Turkish women. Because the military 
functions as a masculinizing institution, and because militaristic values have traditionally 
enjoyed such great prestige, women in Turkey have been treated as second-class citizens: 
they can be recognized as patriots in their service to the republic, but in their private lives 
they remain subject to their fathers or husbands (23). To pursue the emancipation of 
women, then, feminists have attempted to undermine the officially promoted conception of 
womanhood. One valuable way for feminists to do this, according to Selek, would be to 
form alliances with the anti-militarist movement. If it is true that the dominant masculine 
values of the state are closely connected with certain militarizing practices, then the feminist 
and anti-militarist causes should overlap (21). But as Selek points out, cooperation, when it 
has existed at all, has been difficult. The anti-militarist movement has tended to focus its 
attention on conscientious objectors while the feminist movement has focused too narrowly 
on women’s rights, so that the two groups have consistently proceeded along their own 
separate paths (27). They have been unable, in other words, to form a “we” with an identity 
sufficiently contentful to create a politically effective sense of solidarity. If each group 
identifies too closely with its own most pressing concerns, then the alliances essential to the 
majoritarian strategy remain weak. On the other hand, the groups’ most pressing concerns 
are connected to their given identities, from which they have good reason to resist 
disidentifying too much. As Balibar has suggested, it seems there can be no successful 
negotiation of this tension between movements of identification and disidentification 
without the exercise of phronesis. 
I believe that Violence, politique et civilité aujourd’hui: La Turquie aux prises avec ses tourments 
will be valuable for anyone interested either in contemporary Turkish emancipatory 
movements or in concrete applications of Étienne Balibar’s political philosophy, and in 
particular his conception of a politics of civility. The essays are written in a straightforward, 
relatively jargon-free style that should make them accessible to intelligent and motivated 
undergraduates. I would not characterize the book as essential reading for scholars in 
politics, philosophy, Middle Eastern Studies, or sociology, but I nonetheless recommend it 
highly. 
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